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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
CINDY DEATS, 
Plaintiff/Appellant, 
vs. 
COMMERCIAL SECURITY BANK, 
Defendant/Respondent« 
Case No. 860372 
ARGUMENT I 
THE LANGUAGE OF INSTRUCTION NO. 25 MISSTATES A PLAINTIFF'S DUTY 
OF CARE SINCE IT REQUIRES A PLAINTIFF TO SEE AND AVOID A HAZARD 
OR BE FOUND NEGLIGENT. 
The Petitioner does not argue with the Respondent's 
statement of the law regarding a business invitor's duty of care 
owed to a business invitee. Nor does the Petitioner argue with 
the Respondent's statement of law addressing a plaintiff's duty 
to act reasonably under the circumstances as stated in Moore v. 
Burton Lumber, 631 P.2d 865 (Utah 1981), and Jacobson Constr. Co. 
v. Structo-Lite Engineering, Inc., 619 P.2d 310 (Utah 1980). 
However, Petitioner recognizes a very significant distinction in 
the language addressing a plaintiff's required duty of care as 
contained in Moore and Jacobson, and that duty as phrased in the 
language of Instruction No. 25 derived from the Whitman v. W. G. 
Grant line of cases (Whitman v. W. G. Grant Company, 16 Utah 2d 
81, 395 P.2d 918 [1964]; Hindmarsh v. 0. P. Skaggs Foodliner, 21 
Utah 2d 413, 446 P.2d 410 [1968]; Richards v. Anderson, 9 Utah 2d 
17, 337 P.2d 59 [1959] ). 
While it is true that the Moore and Jacobson cases address 
the distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk, 
the language of Instruction No. 25 clearly does not. It should 
be noted that the Whitman line of cases, from which Instruction 
No. 25 was derived, were all decided at a time when contributory 
negligence was a complete bar to recovery. As a result, the 
language of Instruction No. 25 goes far beyond the present duty 
as stated in Moore and Jacobson. 
Instruction No. 25 read as follows: 
Ordinarily, a plaintiff in any action has a duty of 
seeing and avoiding, if reasonable, a hazard which is 
plainly visible, and if the plaintiff unreasonably 
failed to do so, then the plaintiff is negligent either 
in failing to look or in failing to heed what he or she 
saw. 
Clearly, the language of Instruction No. 25 does not address any 
distinction between primary and secondary assumption of risk. 
The instruction absolutely requires that a plaintiff see and 
avoid a hazard or be found negligent. *The language of the 
instruction requires a jury to focus on the limited question of 
whether a plaintiff saw and avoided a hazard instead of the 
general question of "whether a reasonably prudent person in the 
exercise of due care would have incurred the risk, and if so, 
whether he would have conducted himself in the manner in which 
the plaintiff acted in light of all the surrounding 
circumstances, including the appreciated risk." Jacobson at 312; 
Moore at 870. 
Given the differences in the language describing a 
plaintiff's required duty of care as contained in the Moore and 
Jacobson line of cases and that duty as described in the Whitman 
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line of cases, the Court of Appeals' ruling that Instruction No. 
25 is a proper statement of law creates confusion and conflict 
regarding a plaintiff's duty of care in negligence actions. 
ARGUMENT II 
RESPONDENT IS NOT ENTITLED TO ATTORNEY'S FEES PURSUANT TO RULES 
33 AND 40 OF THE RULES OF THE UTAH SUPREME COURT. 
Respondent suggests that, since the Petitioner has taken 
advantage of the available procedural remedies seeking a reversal 
of a jury's verdict, and that, since the Petitioner carries a 
heavy burden, the Respondent is entitled to attorney's fees. 
Respondent's conclusory statement that the Petitioner's rights 
"depend upon technical and strained interpretations of authority, 
despite rejection of these same arguments by lower courts in 
reliance upon the same authority" is not a sufficient reason to 
impose sanctions or attorney's fees. 
It is clear that the Petitioner's actions are not for the 
purpose of delay since any delay is of no benefit to the 
Petitioner since the jury and Court of Appeals rendered their 
decisions against her. Given the significant differences in the 
language addressing a plaintiff's required duty of care in the 
cases cited and the fact that this Court has addressed the 
evolution of such duty in the Moore and Jacobson cases, the 
Petitioner's decision to petition for certiorari is warranted 
under existing law. 
CONCLUSION 
Petitioner respectfully requests that this Court issue a 
writ of certiorari to allow the Supreme Court to address and 
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clarify the issues raised herein. 
DATED this / P d a y of February, 1988. 
ROBERT A. ECHARD 
Attorney for Petitioner/Plaintiff 
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